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MINISTERIAL CAREERS AND THE NATURE OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT: 
THE CASES OF AUSTRIA AND BELGIUM (1 ). 
j.Blondel, European University Institute, Florence.
Although, as a result of numerous studies, we now 
begin to know better the way in wnich cabinet government operates, 
many aspects of the structure and of the decision-making processes 
which characterise this form of government remain obscure. 
Moreover, as these studies are mostly single-country analyses, we 
still do not perceive the extent of the variations from one 
cabinet government to another; nor can we determine with precision 
the factors which account for these variations.
The question which raises most controversies is 
that of the nature of the decision-making process. In principle, 
in cabinet government, decisions are taken collectively: in this, 
cabinet government is unique, or almost unique in the contemporary 
world and it differs in particular from presidential government, 
let alone from authoritarian systems. Yet it is often pointed out 
in practice that the arrangements are often hierarchical and, in 
particular, that the head of the government has acquireu a 
"presidential" stature; but this view continues to be challenged, 
in particular in Britain (2). It does indeed seem that the 
situation varies markedly and that many factors, including the 
nature of political norms, the character of the party system, and 




























































































variations. It is therefore manifest that a satisfactory answer to 
the question will be given only when the analyses become fully 
comparative.
The problem of the nature of the decision-making 
process in the cabinet is not the only matter which raises 
controvei'sies with respect to cabinet government, however. The 
structure and composition of the executive also need to be 
examined, both because they form part of the comprehensive picture 
which we need to obtain and because they also have an indirect 
effect on the nature, collective or hierarchical, of the decision­
making process. To begin with, cabinet government is also 
traditionally referred to as parliamentary government since the 
cabinet is responsible to parliament and can only survive as long 
as it can muster a parliamentary majority. But the question of 
parliamentary responsibility leads to the matter of the 
composition of the cabinet. In his Analysis of Political Sytems, 
for instance, D.V. Verney goes as far as stating that, in cabinet 
governments, ministers are "usually members of Parliament" (3); 
indeed, if ministers are responsible to parliament, it seems 
politically wise that they should also normally be drawn from the 
legislature. The question therefore arises as to whether it is 
indeed the case that ministers are always drawn from parliament in 
substantial numbers and whether, for instance, the French Fifth 
Republic practice of appointing outsiders is limited to the 
peculiarly ’hybrid' character of that system of government. Yet 
the fact that ministers are drawn from Parliament is far from 




























































































it can be hypothesised that men and women who have worked together 
in a parliamentary setting are likely to know each other rather 
well and behave towards each other in the Cabinet differently from 
the way they would if they were complete strangers, as might on 
the contrary be the case in a presidential system on the American 
model.
Other aspects of the composition ana structure of 
cabinets are equally important to examine. The duration of 
ministers in office has indeed often been regarded as an indicator 
of the 'health' of the political system; it is manifestly 
important when the turnover is very high, as was the case in 
France under the Fourth republic and in Greece until 1952. But 
duration needs also to be examined for another reason: in cabinets 
where some ministers are of long-standing wnile others remain in 
office for very short periods, collective decision-making will 
tend to be impaired. Duration is not the only factor worthy of 
examination, however: at least two further aspects need to be 
considered. Ministers who come and go may play a larger part than 
would be suggested by the number of years in which they are in 
office, on the one hand; and, on the other, the duration in each 
post may be as relevant as the overall tenure. Thus the shape and 
complexity of the ministerial career are likely to be important 
elements in the nature of the decision-making process.
This matter in turn raises another problem, that of 
departmental influence v. overall influence within the cabinet. 
Someome who has headed the same department for many years may be 




























































































more transient; but such a minister may play a limited part in the 
rest of the decision-making process. There seems to be a trade-off 
here: the longer a minister stays in a given position, the greater 
his or her departmental role, but the less his or her overall 
governmental influence. Moreover, departmental influence also 
depends on the extent to which ministers are 'amateurs' or 
'specialists' in the departments of which they are the heads: it 
could also be hypothesized that specialists are likely to 
concentrate on their department and be little concerned with the 
affairs of the government as a whole.
As a first step towards a full examination of these 
career patterns in a Western European context, a look at the 
examples provided by Austria and Belgium seemed potentially 
rewarding. For these two countries appear to provide two different 
models of career patterns within the parliamentary system; they 
seem at first sight to be two of the most extreme cases along a 
continuum. To begin with, the Austrian system is markedly simpler 
and more stable than the Belgian system. For twenty years, between 
1945 and 1966, Austria was ruled by a grand coalition; there were 
then four years of a single party populist government (1966-70); 
these were followed by a long period of.socialist rule (1970-83); 
a 'small' socialist-liberal coalition came to power in 1983. There 
were only six chancellors during the period, and the average 
duration of ministers was between 5 and 6 years, still not very 
long in absolute terms, but subtantially above the average for 
Western Europe. Belgium, on the contrary, has had many different 




























































































only exception being the CVP/PSC government of 1954-8); these 
governments rarely lasted beyond a few years (4). There have been 
fourteen prime ministers and the average duration of ministers has 
been of about 3.8 years, one of the lowest in Western Europe, 
though still equal to the world average.
Austria and Belgium seemed therefore to be two good 
cases to examine in order to assess the extent ana character of 
the variations of cabinet government across Western Europe. If the 
ministerial composition in the two countries is basically similar, 
if there are only variations in duration and if these are entirely 
due to differences in.the party system, it becomes permissible to 
conclude that there is basically one model of cabinet government; 
if, on the other hand, other differences are revealed in the 
nature and characteristics of ministerial careers in the two 
countries, it becomes reasonable to suggest that there are various 
types of cabinet government, these types in turn being likely to 
affect the characteristics of the decision-making process. We 
shall therefore first explore somewhat more in detail the 
variations in ministerial duration, before examining the 'shape' 
of the ministerial career in the two countries, its relationship 
with the parliamentary career and the extent to which the 
professional career, both before and after ministerial office, 
seems both to affect and be affected by the governmental positions 




























































































■ 1 . The duration of ministers in office in Austria 
and Belgium.
Between 1945, at the tine of the constitution of 
the first regular postwar government, and the end of 1984, 97 
different persons occupied a post of minister or chancellor in the 
Federal Republic of Austria; in Belgium, during roughly the same 
period, from the liberation of the country at the end of 1944 to 
the end of 1984, there were 213 ministers. Although Belgian 
governments were, in general, somewhat larger than their Austrian 
equivalents, and although the period under consideration is 
slightly longer for Belgium than for Austria, the bulk of the 
difference is due to the appreciably more rapid turnover of 
personnel in Brussels than in Vienna: on average, a Belgian 
minister was in office for under four years, and an Austrian 
minister for five and a half years.
Of course, in absolute terms, even the duration of 
Austrian ministers is not very long. Five and a half years is but 
a moment in someone’s working life; and, as a matter of fact, as 
this 'moment' occurs typically at around the age of fifty, the 
ministerial career is often not the crowning of a political life, 
the last step achieved after having moved up a long ladder and 
before retirement (unlike, for instance, the situation which often 
prevails in the Soviet Union) (5). A ministerial position may be 
viewed by its holder as well as by others as the most prestigious 




























































































usually not the last. Ministers have therefore to find, after they 
cease being in office, positions which are both sufficiently 
rewarding financially and intellectually to compensate for what 
constitutes at least for many a loss of power and emotional 
excitement: we shall return to this point in the last section of 
this paper.
Yet, even if the average ministerial career is not 
very long in absolute terms in Austria, it is appreciably longer 
than in Belgium. The characteristics of the reasons for the 
differences are therefore clearly worthy of investigation. In both 
countries, the average summarises a fairly regular distribution, 
with the result that the proportions of Belgian ministers lasting 
under a year, between one and two years, and even between two and 
five years are larger than the corresponding proportions of 
Austrian ministers, while the reverse occurs among ministers 
lasting between five and ten years and over ten years (Table I). 
At both extremes, however, the difference is substantial, with 
only 9 percent of Austrian ministers having been in office under a 
year against 15.5 percent of their Belgian colleagues and, on the 
other hand, only 7 percent of the Belgian ministers having been in 
office ten years or more against 16 percent of the Austrian 
members of the government. Although the core of the ministers, in 
both countries, remained in office for substantial but not very 
long periods, the contrast at both ends is sharp.
As a matter of fact, the contrast might be felt to 
be even sharper among the 'transient' ministers, as four of tne 




























































































within this group for the purely technical reason that they were 
appointed during the last year of this investigation: in reality, 
there were only five Austrian ministers who truly were in office 
for under a year throughout the period. However, a further element 
of distortion, this time to the detriment of the Belgian average, 
stems from the fact that early postwar Belgian governments had a 
larger than average proportion of one-year ministers, while the 
Austrian provisional government, which also lasted less than a 
year, was not included in the inquiry since it preceded the 
stablishment of the parliamentary system. The percentages of 
'transient' ministers are thus probably somewhat inflated for 
special reasons in the two countries, but a large difference 
remains.
A substantial difference also exists at the other 
extreme where 16 Austrian government members lasted in office ten 
years or more, as against 15 Belgian ministers in the same 
category, although the total number of ministers was more than 
twice as large in that country. These long-standing ministers 
remained on average in office for about thirteen years in both 
countries, Spaak and Kreisky being respectively the longest
office-holders in Belgium and Austria. The extent of the
difference between the two countries can be summarised by
considering the aggregate proportion of all the ministerial 
positions occupied by long-term ministers. In Belgium, the 15 
members of the government who stayed in office ten years or more 
jointly occupied a quarter of all the positions, not an 




























































































belonginy to the same group took over two-fifths of the 
posts.
However, although ministers with long or very long 
experience are proportionately more numerous in Austria
and 'transient' ministers proportionately more numerous in 
Belgium, the nature of the decision-making process may not be 
markedly affected for that reason alone. For there is in both 
countries a large group of members of the government
who stay in office for periods ranging fron two to nine years: 
indeed, the percentage in this category is the almost same in both 
countries - 56 to 58% -, although Belgium had rather fewer 
ministers lasting in office between five and nine years and rather 
more lasting between two and five years. From the point of view of 
the holder, five years may not be long; but it is a sufficient 
period to give substantial ministerial experience. There may be 
somewhat more ministers in Belgium who have little occasion to 
make their mark on the government; yet the proportions of those 
members of the government are sufficiently small not to have a 
major effect, per se, on the nature of the decision-making process 
and on patterns of interaction among the ministers.
Ministerial duration is shorter in Belgium tnan in 
Austria, but the distribution around the average is approximately 
normal in each case: what factors, then, appear to account for the 
difference? Should it be attributed to characteristics of the 
ministerial 'culture' which are sui generis or are general 
political variables at play? The Belgian party system is more 



























































































- 1 0 -
to build and rather more fragile in Belgium. Does this affect the 
duration of ministers in office as well as the number of 
governments?
Although only a broadly-based comparative analysis 
can be expected to help to distinguish satisfactorily among the 
various elements contributing to variations in duration, the 
circumstances of the party composition of governments in Austria 
and Bewlgium help at least to throw some light on one important 
'structural' aspect, the role of party dominance. For, while 
coalitions are more complex in Belgium, one party has been in 
office almost continuously throughout the period, the Christian 
Social party: it was excluded from the government only between 
1954 and 1958. The Belgian Christian Social party has thus 
provided ministers for as many years as the Austrian Socialist 
party, which, too, was only out of office for four years, between 
1966 and 1970, while, on the other hand, the Austrian Populist 
party ceased to be represented in the government after 1970. This 
party dominance comes to be translated in the composition 
of cabinets, both because the average duration of ministers and 
because the percentage of long-standing ministers is larger for 
the Belgian Christian Social party (4-9 years) and the Austrian 
Socialist party (6.4 years) than for other parties. At the other 
extreme, members of the Belgian regional parties were in office 
for substantial shorter periods: none stayed in office as many as 
three years while no 'non-party' minister stayed in office as many 
as four years, and overall, the average duration of the non-party, 



























































































- 1 1 -
half the ovewrall average. Moreover, practically all the Austrian 
long-standing ministers are found to be Socialist (14 out of 16), 
and a substantial majority of their Belgian counterparts belong to 
the Christian Social Party (10 out of 15).
Party dominance has thus considerable significance. 
The influence of other general structural factors jls less marked 
or less clear: for instance, contrary to what might have been 
expected, the turnover of prime ministers seems to have only a 
limited impact. It may have some effect at the lower end, in that 
the number of Belgian 'transient' ministers seems to be somewhat 
increased, in all parties, including the Christian Social party, 
as a result of changes of government. But the impact at the upper 
end is not very clear: there were seven long-standing ministers in 
Austria during the 1945-1970 period, as many as during the 
admittedly shorter period (13 years) of the Kreisky government.
The conclusions which can be drawn from the 
analysis of the ministerial duration in Austria and Belgium are 
therefore the following. (1) First, duration is longer among 
ministers of a dominant party than among other ministers. As a 
matter of fact, twenty years or more in office is essential if the
proportion of lolly — Standing . i i i u i a  t e i ' S  i s  t o  ba x ' e x a t x v e l y  1 a l ' y  e .
This conclusion applies to both countries, despite the impression 
that long-term ministers are 'naturally' rare in Belgium. (2) Even 
when there is a marked dominance of a party, the proportion of 
long-standing ministers remains relatively small: in the best 
case, that of the Austrian Socialists, about a quarter of the 



























































































- 1 2 -
these remained in office more than fifteen years, although the 
party was in the government for 35 of the 39 years of the analysis 
(a further two achieved 1 5 years in office since the end of this 
period, however). (3) These long-standing ministers are often not 
forced out of office by their age, though age appears to play a 
larger part in Belgium than in Austria: in the latter country, a 
majority of the long-standing ministers left office before they 
were 65; in neither country was more than a small minority still 
in office when they reached 70. (Table III). (4) At the other end 
of the continuum, dominant parties are less likely to have many 
transient and short-term ministers. In Belgium, there were 
proportionately fewer of them among members of the Christian 
Social Party than among Socialists and among members of both these 
parties than among Liberals. Clearly, the precise relationship 
between party dominance and duration needs to be examined 
systematically by considering its effect across Western Europe, 
but the existence of an influence appears to be without doubt. (5) 
The relative stability of coalitions appears also to have an 
effect on the proportion of transient and short-term ministers: 
ministers in both these categories are relatively numerous even 
among members of the Belgian Christian Social Party, as 
governments have been relatively shaky and the emergence of new 
prime ministers appears to open up the possibility for a 
relatively rapid turnover, even within a dominant party such as 
the Belgian Christian Social Party. Thus, overall, Austrian 
Populist ministers are bunched, so to speak, between tenures of 



























































































- 1 3 -
a& against much lower percentages in the other major parties which 
are considered here, either Decause the percentage of long­
standing ministers is high (Austrian Socialists) or Decause tne 
percentage of transient ministers is high (Belgian Socialists and 
Liberals), while the Belgian members of the Christian Soccial 
Party occupy an intermediate position.
The examination of the ministerial duration in the 
two countries does not therefore provide evidence suggesting 
the existence of contrasting types of cabinet government. In the 
two countries, the core of the ministerial personnel stays in 
office for substantial, yet relatively limited periods, with 
the dominance of one party contributing to an increase in the 
average duration and to overall stability. If we are looking for 
different models, duration alone does not provide tne answer, 
however large is the gap between Austria and Belgium in this 
respect.
2. The shape of the ministerial career in Austria and Belgium.
Duration in office is not the only characteristic 
of the ministerial career, however. Another important feature is 
the 'shape' of the career which results from the extent to which 
ministers change positions or come in and out of the government. 
While the profile of ministerial duration may not be sufficiently 



























































































- 1 4 -
shape of the career shows great variations. The Austrian 
ministerial career is simple and straightforward; someone is 
appointed to a post; he or she occupies that post for a number of 
years; and once he or she leaves the post, the ministerial career 
also ends. Only in a small minority of cases does a minister 
change the position held in the government; and only exceptionally 
is the career 'interrupted'. Out of 97 Austrian ministers, 78 
(four-fifths) had one post and only one; only five ministers had 
an interrupted career, in two cases (one of whom was Kreisky) 
because, being Socialists, they could not participate in the 
single-party Populist government of 1966: they returned to office 
in 1970. By contrast, the Belgian ministerial career is markedly 
more complex. To begin with, less than half the ministers in that 
country held one post only: i07 out of 213 occupied at least two 
positions, and many of these had three, four or more posts in 
succession. Moreover, while only five Austrian Cabinet members 
came to office more than once, 68 Belgian ministers - a third of 
the total - were in government in at least two different 
occasions. (Table IV).
It seems therefore possible to speak of two truly 
different careers. This is indeed particularly the case because it 
is not just the career in general, but even more the successful 
career which is different. Not surprisingly perhaps, a large 
number of Belgian ministers who held one post only are to be found 
among the 'transient' or 'short-term' groups. It follows that only 
a relatively small minority of the successful, and indeed almost 



























































































- 1 5 -
held office in a non-interrupted manner. Belgian ministers who had 
more than one post, on the other hand, and even more those whose 
career in the government was interrupted were in office more than 
twice os long (6.4 Vj_ 2 and o naif years) as tnose of their 
colleagues whose tenure of office was continuous; there is even a 
difference of two and a half years between the average tenure of 
those who were in office more than once and that of all other 
ministers who stayed in office over two years (6.4 v. 3.9 years). 
Thus tne Belgian government is different from the Austrian 
government in two ways. First, ministers have to hold more than 
one post if they wish to stay in office more than two or three 
years; and, second, they have to accept to come ana go in and out 
of office if they wish to be ministers for more than five or six 
years. This relationshp between numbers of posts and duration is 
almost unknown in Austria.
In that country, the 'natural' way in which a 
minister develops a successful career is by holding only one 
position ever in the government. Admittedly, even if transient and 
snort-term ministers are exciuaea, one-post ministers stayed m  
office only about the average for all Austrian ministers (five and 
a half years), but the range is substantial. While about half of 
them (29 out of 53) stayed in office less than five years, a third 
were in office for between five and ten years and even five 
(almost 10 percent of the group) stayed in office for over a 
decade; three of these even remained at the head of the same 
ministry continuously for thirteen years. While one-post ministers 



























































































- 1 6 -
office only for an 'intermediate' period of time, it is far from 
unknown for them to remain in the government for long periods and 
it is even fairly common for them to stay in office for what was 
defined earlier as a 'substantial' period. There is no stigma 
attached to the one-post minister in Austria, quite the contrary; 
it is only that, in the nature of things, ministers who are 
relatively unsuccessful (or unlucky, for instance if they join the 
government shortly before a change takes place in the party 
composition of the Cabinet, as occurred in 1966 and 1970 in 
Austria), also are extremely likely to occupy only one position; 
therefore, the group of the 'successful' one-post ministers must 
be considered separately from the group of those who are 
transient. In Austria, 23 different persons had only one post and 
stayed in office five years or more - a quarter of all the 
ministers in the country during the period; these remained in
•A' *
office on average for about eight years, less than the 19 
ministers who had more than one post, but surely a sign of 
success. This large group of truly successful one-post ministers 
has no equivalent in Belgium.
For, in Belgium, the one-post minister is one whose 
duration in office may be intermediate rather than short or 
transient, but is almost never substantial let alone long-term. Of 
the 39 ministers who were in office at least two years but had one 
post only, two remained in office for more than five years (in 
fact they were in office for under six years), while exactly half 
the others (19) were in office for less than three years. Not 



























































































- 1 7 -
office was only about three years (38 months ) while the equivalent 
group remained in the government more than two and a half years 
longer in Austria (5.5 years). As a matter of fact, one finds 
within this group the same inter-party differences as those which 
we noticed earlier: while two-thirds of the Social Christian 
ministers in this category lasted more than three years in office 
(12 out of 18), the proportions are reversed for the members of 
the other parties, as nearly two-thirds of these were in tne 
government between two and three years only. (TaDle V).
In Belgium, therefore, long-term ministers and even 
those who stayed in office for a substantial period only (between 
five and ten years) are found almost exclusively among those 
members of the government who had more than one post, whether in 
succession or with interruptions. These constitute of course a 
much larger' proportion of the ministers than in Austria: togetner, 
these two groups form over half the total (107 out of 213, while 
the corresponding groups include only 19 of the 97 Austrian 
ministers). As a matter of fact, the duration in office is likely 
to be longer among tnose whose career was interrupted than among 
those whose career was continuous, even in more than one post (6.4 
years against nearly 5).
This situation reflects again the extent to which 
coalitions and indeed individual governments are more frequently 
reshuffled in Belgium than in Austria. Indeed, the extent of the 
movement within the governments in Belgium is even greater if one 
takes into account the number of posts which each of the Cabinet 



























































































- 1 8 -
more than one post in Austria almost never had more than two ( in 
fact two cases only); in Belgium, on the contrary, both those who 
had different posts in succession and those who had an interrupted 
ministerial career often had more than two posts. Thus the 38 
ministers who had more than one post in succession had jointly 89 
positions - an average of two and a half posts per Cabinet member; 
the 71 ministers whose career was interrupted also held on average 
two and a half posts (2.56), at any rate if the cases in which the 
same post was held twice or more are counted as only one position, 
as, if one were to count these as different positions, the average 
would be raised to almost three and a half posts (3-37). A 
successful career in government in Belgium entails therefore being 
given more than one post, a situation which may be forced upon the 
ministers by the conditions of the political system, but one which 
probably also has the effect of precipitating the movement of 
Cabinet members from one position to another.
The relative 'success' of a career can be measured 
by the time spent in the government; it can also be assessed by 
examining the particular positions held by the ministers. It is 
often believed that there is a cursus honorum: ministers would 
first begin by holding relatively less 'important' positions 
before moving to the key jobs. Although it is difficult to test 
precisely such a hypothesis, as there are no definite criteria by 
which to 'grade' the ministerial departments, one can at least 
determine a rough ranking. Cabinet posts have thus been divided 
into three ctaegories, namely the positions of prime minister and 



























































































- 1 9 -
affairs, interior, defence, justice, finance and economy), and the 
others. If there is indeed a cursus honorum, the first position a 
minister would achieve would tend to be one of the 'other' posts, 
the second, one of the influential positions and the third, those 
of prime minister or deputy prime minister.
The examination of the position held by ministers 
in succession in Belgium suggests that such a cursus honorum 
exists, though only to a limited extent. The positions of prime 
minister or deputy prime minister are rarely reacned immediately, 
to be sure; but, while the proportion of ministers appointed to 
'other' posts declines as one moves from the first position held 
to the second and beyond, there are also many cases when ministers 
hold an 'important' position as a first Cabinet job. Overall, the 
probability of obtaining an influential department increases only 
slowly from the first to the fourth post (from a little over a 
quarter to a little over a third); conversely, the proportion of 
ministers in other posts declines from two-thirds to a little over 
half from the first to the third position held in the government 
and only falls very sharply with the fourth and fifth positions. 
Some Belgian ministers have to wait to be given an influential 
department, but many reach these positions from the start. (Table 
VI).
The detailed examination of the ministerial career 
in Belgium does therefore show that, for the majority of the 
office-holders and especially for those who are fortunate enough 
to stay in government for a relatively long period, there is a 




























































































that such a career does not have a very distinct profile and in 
particular is often not based on the gradual movement to the top. 
Ministers move from one job to another, but the movement is 
usually sideways. While, unlike in Austria, it is not possible to 
make a real career in the government in Belgium without changing 
posts, it is the change per se which is the critical variable, not 
the character of the change.
The Belgian and Austrian ministerial careers are 
thus very different. A Belgian Cabinet member stays in the same 
post two or three years, and at most four or five, while an 
Austrian minister may stay in the same position for half a decade 
in many cases and for a decade occasionally. It does seem that 
some consequences must follow for the characteristics of the 
governmental and adminstrative life of the two countries. For the 
propensity to rotate (rather than move up or stay put) suggests an 
even greater degree of 'instability' in Belgium, by comparison 
with Austria, than the overall figures of ministerial duration 
suggest: there is an instability of the posts which are held 
beyond the shorter tenure of the ministers in Belgium. Overall, 
the 213 Cabinet members in that country held 445 different posts — 
an average of slightly over two positions per minister; the 97 
Austrian office-holders held only 120 posts - an average of about 
1.2 positions. There were somewhat over twice as many ministers in 
Belgium than in Austria during the same period; but there were 
nearly four times as many individual jobs held by Belgian 
ministers as by Austrian ministers.
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While there is relative instability in the Belgian 
government, there is also greater knowledge, on the part of 
Belgian ministers, of the affairs of departments other than the 
ones which they are leading. Moreover, at any rate as far as those 
ministers whose career is interrupted and who constitute, as we 
know, a third of the total, the experience acquired is clearly of 
a different character from the one which is acquired in Austria by 
long-standing ministers who at most move posts only once 
throughout their governmental career. Belgian ministers remain in 
office appreciably less, on average, than Austrian ministers; but 
their experience is usually more varied and in many cases extends 
over a longer period than it does in Austria, because of the 
interruptions between posts. Pernaps this means that it is not 
realistic to make a straightforward comparison of duration; years 
outside the government may constitute periods of reflection 
during which further experience is acquired. What is clear is that 
we are confronted here with a different profile of career which in 
turn leads to a different model of cabinet government - a 
difference which patterns of duration alone did not manifest but 
which the shape of the career amply demonstrates.
It is of course impossible to state without an 
examination of governmental outputs whether the departments which 
were led on average for between one and two years in Belgium by 
the same minister were less well directed than their Austrian 
equivalents which were led on average by men and women staying in 
office in the same post for five years; but it is at least clear 
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juust in reality be substantively different in Belgium from what it 
is in Austria. These relatively rapid movements, linked to the 
parliamentary rather than ministerial character of the career, 
suggest that Belgian Cabinet members truly form political 
governments, while the Austrian experience of office-holders 
resembles more to a managerial team.
3. Ministerial career and parliamentary career.
Anyone familiar with the broad patterns of 
governmental coalitions in Austria and Belgium would probably 
expect Belgian ministers to have an altogether more complicated 
ministerial career than Austrian ministers, and in particular come 
in and go out of the government as a result of relatively frequent 
reshuffles; but this is not the only marked difference between the 
two ministerial careers. For, perhaps more remarkably, Austrian 
governments also differ from Belgian governments by the extent of 
the link between ministers and parliament. Both countries have 
ostensibly adopted the parliamentary system; but, if the 
parliamentary system entails, in Verney's expression, that 
ministers be "usually' drawn from Parliament, the Austrian system 
is only half-parliamentary and it resembles more the practice of 
the French Fifth Republic than the British model. 31 of the 97 
Austrian ministers of the post-1945 period were not 
parliamentarians and a further 18 had not been in Parliament 
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came to power in 1945 with the first postwar elections: tnus aoout 
half the Austrian ministers did not have a parliamentary 
experience on coming to office. This is in marked contrast with 
Belgium where the large majority of members of the government are 
drawn from Parliament: only under 20 percent of the ministers were 
not parliamentarians on coming to office and two-fifths of these 
non-parliamentarians were appointed in the immediate post World 
War II period.
It is true that the other half of the Austrian 
ministers, those who came to office by the parliamentary route, 
had had a relatively long experience, even slightly longer, on 
average, than that of Belgian ministers. The average, which is 6.2 
years in Austrian and 7.1 years in Belgium, does conceal the real 
picture, however, as there is a considerable dispersion, with some 
ministers coming to office after a few years of parliamentary 
experience (a quarter of tne Austrian ministers coming tnrougn tne 
parliamentary route and a fifth of the Belgian equivalents had 
been in parliament under four years), while others had had to wait 
a decade or more before becoming ministers: nearly two-fifths (15) 
of the Austrian ministers who had been in Parliament and slightly 
under a third of their Belgian colleagues ( 53) were in this 
category. A substantial parliamentary experience does therefore 
count for about a quarter of the Austrian members of the 
government and for about two-fifths of their Belgian colleagues.
The Austrian ministerial career can therefore be 
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come to office via the parliamentary route. It is also half- 
parliamentary because it is normally unbroken, while it is broken, 
as we saw, in a third of the cases in Belgium. The interrupted 
character of the career of many Belgian ministers and, indeed, of 
the more successful of these careers, has the effect of increasing 
the duration of the parliamentary career in which this ministerial 
life is, so to speak, embedded. Almost all the Belgian ministers 
whose career was interrupted returned to Parliament during the 
interval: Spaak was an exception in having left Parliament to 
become Secretary-General of NATO. For these ministers, and in 
particular for those whose career was interrupted more than once 
(34 in all), ministerial life and parliamentary life are truly 
intertwined. It is difficult to dissociate the two and the fact 
that a career in government truly stems from parliament is 
obvious. Indeed, on average, for the 67 ministers whose career in 
office was interrupted, the number of years in office is slightly 
shorter than the number of years in Parliament between ministerial 
jobs. There is therefore, for many ministers, a career in and out 
of Parliament which has no equivalent in Austria. (Table VII).
Belgian ministers are thus overwhelmingly drawn 
from within Parliament and many of them are in and out of the 
government over a substantial period. They also tend to remain in 
Parliament, often for many years, and indeed until retirement, 
after the end of their ministerial career. This, too, occurs more 
rarely in Austria: in that country, half the ex-ministers do not 
remain in Parliament at all; of those who do, a substantial 
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the Austrian ministers appeared to settle for a substantial post- 
ministerial parliamentary career; only six of them were still in 
Parliament at the end of the period of analysis and a further six 
had left Parliament after having reached the age of 65.
This picture contrasts from that which describes 
ex-ministers in Belgium. Only a small minority of them (about 20 
percent or 36) did not remain in Parliament after leaving office 
and only a furcner 10 percent (21 ) stayed m  Parliament two years 
or less: thus over two-thirds had a truly substantial post- 
ministerial parliamentary career; a quarter were still in 
Parliament at the end of tne period of analysis while another 
quarter had left Parliament only after they had reached the age of 
65. These are about four times the proportions of the Austrian ex- 
ministers in the same categories. Perhaps because Belgian ex- 
ministers have a higher expectation than their Austrian 
counterparts to return to the Cabinet, a majority of these men and 
women remain in effect in Parliament until the end of their 
working life.
These differences in the proportion of ministers of 
the two countries coming from or returning to Parliament therefore 
build a picture of a 'parliamentary-ministerial1 life in Belgium, 
against only a partly parliamentary life among Austrian ministers; 
for tnese, Parliament is a stepping stone, not a way of life. On 
the one hand, one finds a substantial group of Austrian ministers 
who never had any contacts with Parliament at all except in their 
capacity as ministers, while the Belgian counterparts are a very 




























































































the Belgian parliamentary career is, for the very large majority 
who are drawn from Parliament, much longer than the ministerial 
career; it precedes and continues it; at least for the large 
majority of Belgian Cabinet ministers whose duration in office is 
relatively short, the ministerial life appears to be an episode 
taking place in the midst of a much longer parliamentary career.
The difference between the two countries can be 
expressed in a quantitative form. Belgian ministers who stayed in 
office under a year stayed in Parliament, on average, for over 
twelve years, as also did the ministers who stayed in office for 
between one and two years: for these, the time in the government 
is truly insignificant compared to the time in Parliament. But 
there is a great disproportion even among those who stayed in 
office for longer periods. The 67 ministers whose ministerial 
career was interrupted by periodic returns to Parliament spent, on 
average three times as many years in the Chamber than in the 
Cabinet (17 v\_ 6.4 years); those who had only one period in office 
which lasted more than two years spent in Parliament, both before 
and after their tenure, about three and a half times as many years 
in Parliament as they did in the government (14 years v̂ _ 4 years). 
Very few are the ministers, even the long-standing ones, who spent 
less time in Parliament than in their Cabinet seats.
In Austria, meanwhile, the two-thirds of the 
ministers who had at least some parliamentary experience, before, 
or after, or both before and after their ministerial tenure, did 
not spend on average substantially more time in Parliament than 
they did in the government: the ratio is two ministerial years for
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three parliamentax'y years. Of course, tnis ratio varies 
appreciably, in particular according to the duration in office of 
the ministers: the longer the period in office, the nigher the 
proportion of ministerial years. At one end, the relatively few 
who were ministers one or two years only and were parliamentarians 
spent seven years in the Chamber for every year in the government; 
but those who stayed in office for longer periods spent more time, 
indeed two or three times longer, in the Cabinet than in 
Parliament. This means that, basically, only the unsuccessful 
ministers spent comparatively more time in the Chamber than in the 
government, a situation which contrasts with the Belgian 
experience where nearly all ministers, whatever their length of 
tenure in office, spent more of their active life in Parliament 
than as Cabinet members.
Thus it is not only that many ministers come to 
office in Austria without having to follow the parliamentary 
route; it is that the most successful of even the parliamentary 
ministers have a relatively limited career in the Chamber. While 
in Belgium the time spent in Parliament increases with the 
increase in the ministerial career, or, to put it dif f ex'ently, 
while, in order to have a relatively long ministerial cax’eer, 
Belgian ministers have to stay longer in Parliament, the movements 
go in an opposite direction in Austria: a long parliamentary 
career is therefore in that country normally the sign of a short 
ministerial career, of a failed ministerial career. Parliament is 
neither a precondition of ministerial achievement nor a help 
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cabinet, but as a ladder helps to reach the top; it is not part 
and parcel of -ministerial life, as in Belgium. It is a means, and 
indeed only one of the means, of becoming a member of the Cabinet.
4. Cabinet positions and the overall careers of ministers.
Even when ministers are members of Parliament for 
long periods, their working life starts long before their election 
to a chamber and often extends well beyond they cease to belong to 
it. Moreover, as we saw, especially for Austria, ministers are 
often not parliamentarians or are not parliamentarians for more 
than a few years. Someone reaches the Cabinet at fifty, after 
having been elected to a chamber at around 40; he or she is likely 
to leave the government at about 55 and to leave Parliament well 
before reaching the age of 65. What other careers, before and 
afterwards, is such a minister likely to have had and how far are 
these related to the ministerial job or jobs which he or she may 
have occupied? In what way, if at all, does the early career 
prepare future ministers for governmental office? To what extent 
does the ministerial career provide office-holders with further 
opportunities after they left the Cabinet?
There is no accepted wisdom as to what training and 
what occupations prepare best for a post in the government; but 
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amateurs essentially needing political skills and those who view 
them as managers in charge of complex organisations often 
requiring specialised knowledge. On the surface at least, the 
image of the political minister appears embodied in the Belgian 
practice, while the managerial model appears much closer to the 
Austrian model of governmental life. Does this distinction 
correspond to different patterns of recruitment and are there also 
variations in the 'post-ministerial' life of Cabinet members?
There are indeed differences in the educational and 
occupational origins of Belgian and Austrian ministers, although 
they are perhaps not quite as large as might have been expected: 
Austrian ministers may thus be described as being somewhat more 
'managerial' in origin than Belgian ministers, but the point 
cannot be put more strongly; and in neither country can office­
holders truly be described as specialists.
If we consider as managerial those ministers who 
have a background in the public sector or in private business, 
just under half the Austrian ministers fall in this category while 
the equivalent proportion for Belgium is less than a third. (Table 
VIII). The difference is essentially due, as might have been 
expected, to a substantially higher proportion of civil servants 
becoming ministers in Austria: in Belgium, civil servants provide 
7 percent of the ministers; in Austria, they provide almost a 
quarter. In Belgium, on the other hand, the largest single 
occupational group is that of teachers, and especially of 
University teachers, who provide a third of the ministers and who 
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Austria. Differences in the percentage of teachers and civil 
servants in the two countries account for practically all the 
variation, although there are also a number of journalists in 
Belgium and more manual workers in Austria among the ministers. 
The proportion of lawyers, on the other hand, is practically the 
same in the two countries.
One reason why the differences in the occupational 
background of ministers are not as large as might have been 
expected is because the recruitment of both parliamentarians and 
non-parliamentarians is relatively mixed in the two countries. In 
Austria, a little over a quarter of the non-parliamentarians have 
a civil service background, but as many as 16 percent of the 
parliamentarians were drawn from the same milieu and they are also 
more than twice as likely to come from the civil service than 
Belgian parliamentarians. In Austria, the civil service does 
constitute a substantial basis for a ministerial career, whatever 
route is chosen to reach the government; in Belgium, a civil 
service background does not appear to lead normally to a 
ministerial position. Conversely, while civil servants are not 
strikingly more numerous among non-parliamentarians than among 
parliamentarians in Austria, non-parliamentarian ministers come 
from a wide variety of other backgrounds, including the private 
sector, the law and, to more limited extent, teaching. As a matter 
of fact, private business is somewhat less represented among the 
parliamentarians than among the non-parliamentarians, while 
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Thus the Austrian government has a rather more 
'managerial' character than the Belgian government not just 
because there are more non-parliamentarians among the ministers 
(and certainly not primarily for this reason) but because of a 
political tradition which appears to link politics and the civil 
service more closely than in Belgium. But it would be wrong to go 
much further and suggest that the Austrian government is composed 
of specialists, especially in contrast with the Belgian 
government. In the nature of things, Belgian ministers who often 
hold more than one more than one post in succession, as we know, 
are unlikely to be specialists of the affairs of every department 
which they happen to be in charge of; but, given that lawyers, 
educationalists, and indeed businessmen are present in relatively 
large numbers in Belgian Cabinets, these governments are not 
entirely staffed with amateurs. On the other hand, Austrian 
ministers are more likely to be managers than specialists: not 
many among them are engineers or social workers in charge of 
technical or social departments, while some trade unionists are 
occasionally heading social departments in Belgium. The picture is 
mixed; it suggests, on the one hand, that lawyers, businessmen and 
civil servants are more often in charge of departments 
corresponding to their background in Austria than in Belgium: the 
proportion of ministers whose position is truly closely related to 
their previous background is about a third in Austria as against a 
fifth in Belgium; but, given that many of those who have a 
background which.is relevant to their ministerial position may 
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sector of which they are in charge, the extent of specialisation 
has to be regarded as rather limited. (Table IX).
Yet the fact that ministers in Austria are more 
managerial and are in particular more drawn from the public sector 
than their Belgian counterparts both reflects differences in the 
characteristics of the parliamentary system and indeed in the size 
of the public sector, as well as accounts for variations in the 
'postministerial' career of Cabinet members in the two countries. 
By and large, as we know, a governmental career is not the end of 
a working life: the number of ministers still in office at 65, let 
alone at 70, is small in both countries. It is small even in 
Austria, where, despite the relative longevity of the ministerial 
career, only 17 ministers were still in office at the age of 65, 
about the same number as had left office before reaching 50. Thus, 
for the large majority of the Austrian ministers, the question of 
a 'postministerial' career is clearly an acute problem.
It is indeed more acute than in Belgium. This is 
not so much because Belgian ministers leave office older, as only 
a small minority stay in office beyond the age of 65 (29 or 15 
percent - about the same proportion as in Austria); but, first, 
Belgian ex-ministers are never entirely sure that their 
ministerial career is over, while Austrian ex-ministers must 
realise that the loss of their governmental position effectively 
means that they will never return, since only five returned and no 
case of a returning minister has occurred since 1971. This is of 
course an incentive for Belgian ex-ministers to remain in 
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gives a further advantage to Belgian ex-ministers with respect to 
their final career, for they are more likely, as we saw, to stay 
in Parliament until retirement age: about half of tne former 
members of Belgian Cabinet were still in Parliament at the end of 
the period of analysis or had remained in the chamber until at 
least the age of 65.
The majority of Austrian ex-ministers, as well of 
course as a substantial number of their Belgian colleagues, have, 
on the other hand, to embark on a postministeriai or 
postparliamentary career. Some return to the job from which they 
came, in law, teaching, business or the civil service: those who 
viewed the ministerial career as a stop-gap arrangement designed 
to solve a particular problem may have always intended to return 
to their previous occupation: this seems to have been the case for 
the few judges and military men who have held ministerial office 
in the two countries. But many probably do not wish to return to 
their previous career at the level at which they were, while other 
simply cannot, especially if they have spent a long period in 
Parliament as well as in the government.
There is unfortunately less satisfactory evidence 
with respect to post ministerial careers than for the pre- 
ministerial part of the working life of Cabinet members. No 
information was obtained about 14 Austrian and 12 Belgian 
ministers who were not members of Parliament after leaving the 
government as well as about four Austrian and 38 Belgian ministers 
who left Parliament before the age of 65; moreover, no information 
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who did stay in the Government or Parliament beyond the age of 65 
but who might have engaged in another career afterwards. (Table 
X).
Yet from the other cases a picture emerges which 
does help to provide a general impression of postministerial 
careers in the two countries. To begin with, it must be remembered 
that Belgian ministers have a high propensity to remain in 
Parliament until retirement age, unlike their Austrian colleagues; 
for many of them, activities in the Chamber fully constitute a 
career. This is reinforced by the fact that a number of these 
parliamentarians obtain national positions in their party in 
combination with their activity in the Chamber. Out of the 53 
cases of occupations recorded for Austria and of the 79 cases of 
occupations recorded for Belgium, often alongside a parliamentary 
career, eight Austrian and 19 Belgian ministers obtained such 
party positions; these always went to parliamentarians, even in 
Austria, where, as we saw, the percentage of parliamentarians is 
low among the ministers. In some cases, the posts are likely to De 
more honorific than substantive, but they are probably always at 
least prestigious. This group can therefore be described as that 
of the 'true' politicians, who end their political life by a job 
which is, indeed, political. It is interesting to note that the 
group is proportionately of about the same size in the two 
countries, and, as it is fairly large, it does suggest that, in 
both countries, parties carry a considerable prestige.
The rest of the ministers whose postministerial 
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includes those who return to their old career: they constitute a 
substantial number in the two countries - about twice as larye as 
that of the group of party officials (15 in Austria and 29 in 
Belgium). In the Austrian case, these ex-ministers remain rarely 
in Parliament (4 out of 15), while all except four of the 29 
Belgian ex-ininisters in this category did remain in Parliament 
after leaving office. This group includes ministers with a variety 
of backgrounds: in Belgium, many of those who returned to their 
previous occupation were University teachers, but they also 
included some businessmen as well as some public servants; in 
Austria, the spread is also wide: there were businessmen, 
teachers, civil servants, and lawyers. For these ministers, life 
seems to have run full circle. By choice or because tney were 
unable to start a new career, these former Cabinet members do not 
appear to have benefitted permanently in their career from a 
position in the government.
Meanwhile, other Cabinet ministers do embark in a 
new career: it is with respect to this group that a significant 
difference appears to exist between Austria and Belgium. First, 
they are proportionately twice as numerous in Austria as in 
Belgium: 29 of the former Austrian Cabinet ministers - over a 
third of all the ministers of the country who are no longer in 
office were able to change their occupation after their passage in 
the government. In Belgium, the equivalent group has about the 
same absolute size (31), but the number of ministers, as we know, 
is more than twice as large; moreover, while twice as many 
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previous job, the absolute numbers are about the same in Belgium 
for the two groups. This does seem to point to a governmental 
position in Austria being better able to provide postministerial 
promotion than a governmental position in Belgium.
Moreover, the Belgian ministers who thus embark in 
a new career tend primarily to go to an international post or to a 
job in private business, international posts being often obtained 
in the context of the European Community; Austrian ministers, on 
the contrary, divide almost equally into those who go to- a public 
organisation, to private business or to a business or interest 
group organisation. Posts in the public sector include 
directorships of various State services, such as the railways, 
while posts in the private sector are often in the banking sector. 
Only a small number of former Austrian Cabinet ministers (3) went 
to an international position, Waldheim being by far the most 
outstanding example. It seems therefore that, to an extent at 
least, the ministerial career helps a substantial number of 
Austrian ministers to find a genuine promotion from their original 
occupation at the end of their working life, although this is the 
case for only a minority, while Belgian former Cabinet members, on 
the whole, do not, except within their own party and perhaps in 
the European Coitununity. To this extent also, the Austrian 
ministerial career appears to help ministers to move up a ladder 
throughout the whole of their working life, and to do so within 
the context of a 'managerial' rather than 'political' framework. 
Although it would be wrong to exaggerate the contrast, there is 
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careers, difference which is consistent with and prolongs the 
profile which was delineated in both the ministerial and 
parliajiientary parts of the life of the Cabinet members.
++++
The careers of the men and women who became 
ministers in Austria ana Belgium are thus different in many 
respects. Belgian ministers are closely connected to Parliament, 
indeed to Parliament as a political organisation and a debating 
body. Their career in Parliament is indeed almost always much 
longer than their career in the government, often because they go 
in and out of Parliament. Their original jobs are also related to 
the opportunity to enter Parliament and, not surprisingly, 
teachers and lawyers are at a premium, as well as, to an extent at 
least, businessmen, while civil servants are on the whole not 
onentea towards a parliamentary life. As tne ministerial career 
is embedded in Parliament in Belgium, it does not naturally lead 
to a further career afterwards: former ministers will therefore 
often wait in the chamber to see whether they receive a further 
call to the government; if this call does not occur, they will 
gradually settle in their parliamentary 'condition' while perhaps 
praticing, if this is possible, their original profession. Only 
rarely does ministerial office lead to a new career; and, if such 
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party or in one of the European organisations, sometimes in 
private business, but rarely in a public agency in a managerial 
capacity.
Austrian ministerial careers, on the contrary, have 
a marked managerial character. Those who become ministers are 
given in this way an opportunity to run an agency of the State. It 
is true that they are often not specifically trained for the 
particular department of which they are the heads: it is probably 
assumed that the expertise can be acquired on the spot and the 
period during which ministers stay as heads of their respective 
departments is usually sufficiently long to ensure that such an 
expertise is indeed acquired. Once ministers have accomplished 
their 'mission' - either because they feel or because others judge 
that it is time to make a move (or because, as occasionally 
occurs, changes in the party in power force such a move) - they 
are likely to look for a new career: they are indeed often offered 
one. Occasionally, this new career may be in Parliament, and it 
indeed may include a national party position as well: but this is 
relatively rare. More often this new career takes the form of an 
important managerial job in a nationalised industry or a big 
private undertaking; it may also happen that the minister has to 
return (or wishes to return) to his or her original occupation, 
but this occurs less frequently.
The differences in the careers of ministers and in 
the shape of ministerial life between the two countries go 
therefore much beyond the simple recognition that Belgian 
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their Austrian counterparts. The fact that many Belgian ministers 
come to office more than once suggests that the duration of the 
ministerial career, in psycnological terms, and perhaps even in 
governmental terms as well, cannot be merely measured in Belgium 
by the number of months spent in the government: if the 
ministerial career is embedded in the parliamentary career, if 
parliament is the point of departure and the point of return, the 
ministerial career is also the point of reflection and the 
signpost which parliamentarians consider even when they are out of 
the government. This is why the Belgian government can be truly 
deemed to be political and parliamentary, in contrast with the 
much greater distance between government ana parliament in 
Austria.
The differences in the structure and composition of 
governments are thus considerable between Austria and Belgium. It 
does not follow that the reasons for these variations are 
exclusively cultural, national or historical. They often stem from 
characteristics of the party system, as these affect the nature 
and duration of coalitions as well as the expectations of the 
ministers themselves about the stable or relatively shaky nature 
of the governments. It seems probable, however, that cultural and 
historical factors also play a part: the relatively shorter 
parliamentary experience of Austria by comparison with Belgium, 
and the strong executive-centred and managerial tradition of the 
Habsburg Empire are likely to have left a mark on the shape of the 
ministerial profession and indeed on the image whicn, consciously 




























































































which can only be assessed fully by means of a broad comparative 
analysis extending to all Western European countries.
Whatever the origins of the differences in the 
shape and characteristics of ministerial careers in the two 
countries, these differences are so substantial that they must 
have an effect on the nature of governmental decision-making 
process. Purely 'political' and parliamentary ministers are likely 
to view their role in Cabinet in a different manner from 
'managerial' ministers, even though the constraints of the 
position and of the legally collegial character of tne government 
are naturally likely to provide a unifying framework. What thus 
becomes important is to assess tne extent to which these 
variations in career profiles affect variously Cabinet decision­
making in its several aspects and, in particular, with respect to 
the relationship of ministers to each other and to the head of the 
government.
These are matters which can be examined only by 
relating findings on careers to findings on governmental decision­
making - a subject which requires further exploration before valid 
conclusions can be drawn. Meanwhile, the examination of the 
ministerial careers in Austria and Belgium does at least show that 
the conception of the parliamentary or Cabinet system as a single 
model is oversimplified and probably wrong, whatever tendencies 
there may be towards uniformity in contemporary Western Europe. 
The next step clearly must be to see to what extent ministerial 
carrers in other countries resemble or differ from the patterns 




























































































there are many models, resulting for instance from variations 
along more than one dimension, although it seems, from general 
impressions about Austria and Belgium, that the two countries 
differ probably more from each other than almost any other pair of 
Western European nations. The examination of the ministerial 
condition in the two countries thus opens up a fruitful line of 
investigation; but a broad-based analysis is a natural 
development, as only such an analysis can make it possible to 
discover the full range of the variations and provide an 
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NOTES
(1 ) The present analysis constitutes a first step in a
general study of structures and decision-making processes in 
Western European cabinets which is undertaken at the European 
University Institute in Florence in collaboration with a group of 
scholars from thirteen European countries. I am most grateful to 
Mr L. Dewinter for many comments and suggestions with respect to 
this paper.
(2) From a recent examination of the state of the 
controversy, see P. Hennessy, Cabinet, (1986), London: Blackwell.
(3) D.V. Verney, The Analysis of Political Systems, 
(1959), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 76.
(4) This is true even if one adopts a definition of 
'government' which is based exclusively on two criteria: the same 
prime minister and the same parties in the coalition.
(5) J. Blondel, Government Ministers in the 





























































































Distribution of Hinisterial duration in Austria and Belgium
Aust ria Belgi urn
N
Under 1 year 9
1- 2 years 16
2- 5 years 31
5-10 years 25




































































































D is tr ib u tio n  o f  M in is t r i* !  d u ra tio n  in  A u str ia  
an d  B elgium  by  p a r ty
A u s t r i a B e l g i u m
Overall SPD OP O verall CVPfPSC CVP/PSB Libéral
% B % I % 7. N 7. N 7 N 7,
Under 1 year 9.3 6 12.0 3 7.5 15.5 9 10.7 9 14.5 5 13.2
1-2 years 16.6 7 14.0 5 12. S 21.6 14 16.7 14 22.6 7 18.4
2-5 years 32.0 12 24.0 18 46.0 37.1 29 34.5 26 40.3 17 44.7
6-10 years 26.8 11 22.0 12 30.0 18.8 22 26.2 10 16.1 8 21.1
10 years or more 16.6 14 28.0 2 5.0 7.0 10 11.9 4 6.5 1 2.6



























































































TABLE I I I
Age of retirement of long-standing ministers (10 years or more) 
in Austria and Belgium
Austria Belgium
<N=16> < N = 14)*
SPO OVP CVP/PSC BSP/PSB
Left Office
before 65 6 2 8 3 1 4
at 65-69 4 - 4 3 2 5
at 70 or over 2 - 2 3 1 4
still in 2 - 2 1 - 1
14 2 16 10 4 14




























































































Distribution of Ministers by number of posts occupied in Austria an>
Belgium
A u s t r i a B e 1 g i u m
N $ Average 
durât ion 
< months)
N S6 Average 
durât ion 
(months)
1 post only 78 80,4 49 107 50.2 21
2 posts or
more in succession 14 14,4 129 38 17,9 48
2 posts or more 
interrupted 5 5,2 143 68 31.9 77


































































































R t and Deputy FM 2.8 14.7 14.0 27.3 23.8
'Im portant' M inisters 27.8 31.0 35.0 36.4 48.0
Other M in isters* 88.8 54.3 51.0 36.3 28.2





























































































Duration in office of ministers having had more than one post, by party, i
Austria and Belgium
{Ministers having been in office two years or more only)
Number Average Duration Range
(months) (months)
CVP/PSC 18 41,5 2 7-70
BSP /PSP 10 36,2 24-55
Liberal 7 30,3 27-36





























































































Duration of Ministerial and parliamentary career in Austria and Relgi
A u s t r i a B e l g i u m
Ministers Mini steri al Pariiamentary Ministerial Pariiamentary
having been durat ion durat ion durat i on durat ion
in o f f i c e (excluding (excluding
ministeria1 ministerial
years > years)
under a year 0,6 10,9 0,5 12,7
1-2 years 1 ,4 9,6 1.4 12,4
2 years or
more in one




in succession 10,9 8,1 4,9 12,9
2 years or more
with interrupt -

























































































































































































































Specialists among Austrian and Belgian Ministers
A u s t r i a B e 1 g i u m
N * N X
Specialists 26 27 34 16
Part 1y 
specialists 19 20 31 15
Managers only 6 6 5 2
Not
specialists 25 26 87 41
Unknown or not 
applicable
•(ministry 




























































































P o s t  m i n i s t e r i a l  c a r e e r s  i n  A u s t r i a  a n d  B e l g i u m
A u s t r i a B e 1 g i u m
N % N %
Parliament only of 
who died in Parliament, 










Became Présidait 1 1,0 - -
Became Party Official 8 8,2 19 8,9
New Career 29 29,9 31 14,6
of whan Private Sector 15 15,5 14 6,6
Public Sector 11 11,3 6 2,8
International 3 3,1 11 5,2
Returned to parties only 15 15,4 29 13,6
Died in office, retired 
after 65, unknown job 
Unknown and not in
3 3,1 24 11,3
Parliament 14 14,4 12 5,6
Still in Office 17 17,6 15 7,0
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